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INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 8942

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 088639

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [MNUC](#) [ZP](#) [AE](#)
SUBJECT: FOLLOW UP ON COUNTERPROLIFERATION CASES

REF: A. A) STATE 021428
 1B. B) STATE 034777
 1C. C) 08 STATE 109141

Classified By: ISN Philip A. Foley for reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d)

ACTION REQUEST

11. (U) Post is requested to draw from the points in para 4 with appropriate host country government officials.

End action request.

SUMMARY AND BACKGROUND

12. (S) Washington seeks updates on a number of proliferation-related cases that we have raised with the UAE in the recent past. In light of the 123 Agreement, it will be important to demonstrate UAE progress on these cases to Congress. Prior to the March 19 Counterproliferation Task Force (CTF) meeting in Abu Dhabi, we provided the UAE with a nonpaper listing a series of unresolved proliferation-related cases (ref A). At the March 19, 2009 CTF, the UAE indicated that the entities were under surveillance and that it was still collecting information. (Note: information on the company) Flowtech - was not available at the time of the delivery of the nonpaper. End Note). After the CTF, we followed up with another nonpaper summarizing the outcomes of the meeting and requested that the UAE provide us with information on the results of its investigations (ref B). In September 2008, we also provided the UAE information on Mayrow-related entities; we will want updates on these entities as well (ref C).

End summary and background.

OBJECTIVES

13. (U) Post should achieve the following objectives:

- Secure updates and urge the UAE to expeditiously resolve these cases.

End objectives.

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

14. (S/REL UAE) Begin suggested talking points:

- The United States appreciates our strong counterproliferation relationship.
- Your willingness to investigate and take actions against

front companies and others involved in transferring sensitive items to countries such as Iran are critical to international security.

-- You will recall that prior to the March 19, 2009 Counterproliferation Task Force meeting, we provided you a nonpaper listing proliferation-related cases that we had raised with you in the past.

-- After the Counterproliferation Task Force meeting, we provided you a nonpaper with new information we raised at the meeting.

-- In October 2008, we also provided you information on Mayrow General Trading-related entities for which the U.S. government took certain actions against.

-- As Congress reviews the U.S.) UAE Nuclear Agreement, we would like to share with it, in a classified setting, the progress that you have made in investigating these entities as well as any actions taken.

End suggested talking points.

REPORTING DEADLINE

STATE 00088639 002 OF 002

15. (U) Please report response within ten working days of receipt of this cable.

POINT OF CONTACT

16. (U) Department point of contact for follow-up is Chris Herrington ISN/CPI 647-5035.
CLINTON